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Yom Kippur War (6-25 OCT. 1973) 
     Soviet behavior during this conflict forced Moscow to confront the importance 
of its newly evolving policy of détente with the United States and its historic 
support for regional allies such as Egypt and Syria.  This military support included 
supplying Egypt with over 1,000 tanks, 1,000 armored personnel carriers, over 
100 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, and nearly 100 surface-to-air missile 
batteries between 1970-1973.  This support was offset by Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat’s July 1972 expulsion of Soviet’s 15,000 military personnel, which 
demonstrated the periodically recurring tension within this bilateral relationship 
stemming from Cairo’s displeasure at Soviet attempts to limit use of these 
weapons. 
     Soviet rhetoric emphasized the danger of war during 1973, but privately the 
Soviets avoided direct criticism of their Arab allies.  Multiple factors contributed 
to this conflict, including deeply entrenched Arab-Israeli enmity, Sadat’s desire to 
reestablish Arab political and military credibility following the disastrous 1967 
war, and proving that Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula was not 
permanent, as well as Syrian determination to recapture the Golan Heights.  
Bulgarian and Czechosolovak news agencies referred to Egyptian and Syrian 
attack preparations during  October 2-4, while Izvestia, the official Soviet 
government newspaper, referred to Israeli troop concentrations on October 5.  
On October 4, 1973, the Soviets began airlifting their dependents out of Egypt and 
Syria as a precautionary measure. 
     Despite Israeli assurancess that they would not attack first, as they had in 
1967, the Arabs responded with their assault beginning at 2:00 p.m. on October 6.  
The following day the Soviets started airlifting supplies to Egypt,  and the U.S. 
responded to serious Israeli battlefield losses with its own supply airlift and sealift 
which exceeded the Soviet efforts by 40,000 tons and continued throughout the 
war.  Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Cairo between October 16 and 19 to  
assist the Egyptian war effort. 
     There was tenuous ongoing consultation between Moscow and Washington 
involving policymakers such as Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly 
Dobrynin (1919-2010), U.S. President Richard Nixon, U.S. secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger, and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.  On October 20-21, Kissinger 
arrived in Moscow and both sides attempted to negotiate a cease-fire.  The 
Soviets wanted Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, while Kissinger wanted 
a cease-fire with Israeli troops in place and linked with United Nations Resolution 
242 calling for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory. 
     Negotiations stalled quickly though, and the Israelis expressed concern that 
Washington was negotiating at their expense.  Tensions rose further on October 
24 when Nixon received a note from Brezhnev saying Moscow was prepared to  
send troops to the region if the U.S. refused to participate in an international 
police action.  This same day saw the Soviets move approximately 40-50,000 
airborne troops to staging areas in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine for possible 
deployment to the Mideast. 
    The Nixon Administration responded by upgrading the alert status of U.S. 
military forces to Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3.  On October 25, Kissinger 
expressed U.S. willingness to defend Israel and U.S. national interests in a press 
conference. 
     The Soviets had 95 naval ships in the Mediterranean during the Yom Kippur 
War and the U.S. had 60 naval ships, so a superpower conflict was possible if the 
crisis escalated.  Both the Egyptians and Israelis wanted a cease fire and were 
prepared to negotiate prisoner exchanges and border changes by November 
1973. 
     The Egyptians and Israelis also used the postwar environment to extract 
military and economic assistance from Washington, and Moscow was able to 
economically benefit from higher oil prices stemming from the temporary Arab oil 
embargo. 
     Overall results saw the Soviets increase their support for Arab policies without 
having to militarily intervene on behalf of Cairo or Damascus.  The relative 
cooperation between Moscow and Washington kept the crisis from becoming a 
military conflict, despite diplomatic missteps by both sides, due to their desire to 
maintain détente and United States’ reluctance to get involved in a military 
conflict stemming from the emerging Watergate crisis and public disillusionment 
with the Vietnam War.  Although both Moscow and Washington wanted greater 
peace in the Mideast, each side had different visions on what it would look like. 
The Arabs and Israelis were not ready to take steps that would increase the 
possibility of broader regional peace.  The end result was a bloody conflict 
reinforcing the regional status quo . 
                                                                                                           Bert Chapman 
See also: Arab-Israeli War (1956); Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906-1982); Six Day 
War (June 5-10, 1967) 
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